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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we shall discuss a class of two-player differential games, the so called 
qualitative games. The players do not strive to maximize and minimize a certain payoff 
as is the case in the games of degree, but rather they strive to fulfill more general 
requirements which can be defined, in many problems, in terms of given sets of points. 
In Section 3 we introduce basic concepts. We define optimality of strategies for each 
player, and the surface of the game. 
In Section 4, we focus our attention on properties of the surface of the game with 
a view to constructing it. We state a min-max principle for paths that lie in the surface 
of the game. 
In Section 5, we apply the min-max principle to two examples. 
2. NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY 
Unless otherwise indicated mathematical symbols will be those in common use. 
Additional terminology will be introduced as needed. 
Vectors will be denoted by lower case letters. Subscripts will be used to denote the 
components of a vector; superscripts will be used to distinguish vectors. The 
topological closure of a set ~9 will be denoted by ~,  and the interior of D by ~. 
The term region means an open connected set of the appropriate space. A scalar- 
valued function defined on a region will be said to be of class C k if the function and its 
first k partial derivatives are continuous on the region. A vector-valued function will 
be said to be of class C k if each of its components i of class CL The transpose of a 
matrix M will be denoted by M r. 
* This paper was presented at the U.S.C. Mathematics Colloquium University of Southern 
California, Los Angeles, April 1967. 
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3. FORMULATION OF THE GAME 
3.1. THE STATE EQUATION AND STRATEGIES 
We shall call x = (xt, x~ .... , x~) the state vector of the game in n-dimensional 
Euclidean space E n, where x n = t will denote the time variable. We shall assume that 
the game is governed by the following equation: 
dx 
d--t = f (x ,  u, v) (1) 
where f = (fa ,f~ ..... Jr,), and u = (ux, u~ ..... u~) and v = (v x , v 2 ..... vs) are vectors 
of Euclidean spaces E r and E', respectively, which the players Je  and JE choose at 
each instant of time. Of coursefn(x, u, v) ~- 1. We shall assume that x, u and v belong 
to fixed regions G, U, V, of E% E r and E s, respectively, and that the functionf(x, u, v) 
is of classC lonG • U•  V. 
Strategies for players Je  and JE will be functions of x, p: x- -+p(x)  and e: x ~ e(x), 
x ~ G, such that 
p(x) ~ K~,(x) C U, e(x) ~ K . (x )  C V 
where K~(x) and K~(x) are given subsets of E r and E ~, respectively, which may depend 
on x. 
These sets of strategies will be denoted by 5#e and 5#r respectively. A strategy pair 
(p, e) is a member of ~9~ • 5:E. 
3.2. TRANSFER TIME 
In the following we shall use a variable r, called transfer time. ~ is defined by two 
conditions, namely dr/dt ---- 1 and ~-(t~) = 0 for all x i ~ G, where xn i =- ti 9 
3.3. RULES OF THE GAME 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
dx 
d--T = f (x, u, v) (2) 
For given strategies p and e, Eq. (2) is replaced by 
dx 
d-~ = f (x ,  p(x), e(x)) (3) 
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Equation (3) is said to have a solution if there exists a function ~: r --~ ~?(r) defined 
and continuous on an interval At, such that 2(r) ~ G, Vr 6 AT; and 
d~(,) 
dr - -  f(:~(~)' p(:7(r)), e(:?(r))) 
is satisfied almost everywhere in At. 
Let T be the collection of all subsets of [0, oo) containing 0. Let F be the set of all 
functions :~: T~ -*  G, for all T~ e T. Let q5 be the collection of all nonempty subsets of 
F, and let 
y: G X dfe X 2fE--,O 
be a mapping that associates with each point x * e G and with each pair (p, e) e ~fe x ~9~ 
an element 7"(x i, p, e) of ~, such that ~?(0) = x * for all ~ e y(x i, p, e). 
Here we shall define 7(x i, p, e) as follows: 
(i) if Eq. (3) has no solution ~: r ~ ~(r) in [0, oo) 1 such that ~(0) = x ~, then we 
let ~(#, p, e) be the function 2 whose set of definition is r = 0, such that 2(0) = xi; 
(ii) if that is not the case, then we let y(x ~, p, e) be the set of all maximal solutions 2 
~? of Eq. (3) in [0, oo), such that ~?(0) = x/. 
Hence 7' is defined. The rules of the game are G, the sets of functions p and e, and 
mapping ~,. 
3.4. TARGETS 
Let there be given two sets of points in G, 0e  and 0E, which we shall call the target 
of player Jp and the target of player JE, respectively. We shall assume that 0p and OE 
are closed. 
We have two cases: 
Case (a): neither Op nor 0 E is empty. 
Case (b): Op or 0~ is empty, but not both. In the following we shall assume that 
3.5. TRAJECTORIES AND PATHS 
For given rules, for given strategies p and e chosen by each player, Jp and JE, in 
sets 6de and SPE, and for a given state x i ~ G called the initial state, a curve F~(x i, p, e) 
in G defined by a function ~ E V(x i, p, e) will be called a describing curve. 
Of course, there may be more than one describing curve for given initial state x * and 
given strategies p and e. It is not excluded that f'~(x i, p, e) is a single point. 
1 That is, on some interval dr ~ [0, oo). 
See for instance Ref. 6. 
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Given any describing curve Fr ~, p, e) that emanates from x i, that is defined by 
function ~ on T~, and given %-E T~, the image of [0, Tj] under the graph 
((~, x): x = Y(r)} will be called a trajectory F, F = F ij. Its initial points is x i ~- ~(0), 
its end point is xJ = ~(,j) and its supporting curve is F~(x i, p, e). 
We shall say that F ij is generated by (p, e). It is not excluded that ~-j = 0. 
A trajectory F ij defined by function ~ on [0, ~-j], ~-, # 0, will be called a path ~r, 
= 7r i~, if 
~(~) r B,, w BE W ~ [0, ~) (4) 
It follows from that definition that no point of a path, with the possible exception of 
its end point, belongs to Ov or BE. When ~ -- 0, /'/J is said to be a null path, and 
denoted by ~o. 
3.6. PLAY, TERMINATING PLAY 
A play is the evolution of state x, along a path. 
A terminating play is a play whose end state x I = ~(rl) belongs to Be u BE. It 
terminates at r = ~-I 9 The corresponding path will be called a terminating path. 
3.7. PLAYABLE STRATEGY PAIRS 
In Case (a) we shall say that (p, e) is a weakly payable 3 strategy pair for player Jp at 
point x i if it generates a terminating play from initial state x i, and if the corresponding 
end state x t belongs to Op. 
We shall say that (p, e) is a weakly playable (see footnote 3) strategy pair for player JE 
atpoint x i if it generates a terminating play from initial state x i, and if the corresponding 
end state x I belongs to OE. 
In Case (b) the definition of a weakly playable (see footnote 3) strategy pair for Jp at 
point x i will be the same as in Case (a); and we shall say that (p, e) is a weakly playable 
(see footnote 3) strategy pair for JE at point x i if it is not playable for Jp at that point. 
We shall denote by 37"p(xi) and J'E(X i) the sets of all weakly playable strategy pairs, 
for Jp and Jlr, respectively, at point x i. 
In Case (a) we shall say that a strategy pair (p, e) is strongly playable for Jv at point 
x i if 
(i) it is not playable for JE at xi; and 
(ii) F~(x i, p, e) n B1, ~ ;~ V~ c ~(x ~, p, e) 
Likewise a strategy pair (p, e) is said to be strongly playable for JE at point x i if 
(i)' it is not playable for Jl, at xi; and 
(ii)' /~(x i, p, e) n BE =7/= ~ Y~ ~ ~,(x i, p, e) 
3 or more simply "playable". 
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In Case (b) a strategy pair (p, e) is said to be strongly playable for Je at point x i if 
F~(x ~, p, e) (~ (~e ~ ~ V~ ~ 7(x i, p, e) 
and there will be no difference between the concepts of weak playability and strong 
playability for JE. 
Note that, in every case, strong playability implies weak playability. We shall denote 
by ~4"e(# ) and ~(x  ~) the sets of all strongly playable pairs, for Jv and JE, respectively, 
at point x *. 
3.8. OBJECTIVES OF THE GAME 
The objectives of the game are the target(s), O e and ~9 e in Case (a), 0 e or (9 E in 
Case (b), and two prescriptions, one for player Je and the other for player ./rE. In 
Case (a), for any given x i ~ G, the prescription for player Je is to use a strategy p 6 ~9~ 
such that (p, e) generates a terminating play with end state x s ~ Oj,, no matter what 
the strategy e~ 5PE of ./rE. We shall say that his prescription is to transfer the state to 
(9 e . The prescription for player Je is to transfer the state to (9 E . Of course, one or the 
other player, or both, may be unable to control the play in such a manner that the 
condition which has been prescribed to him is satisfied. 
In a qualitative game, we shall call a winner a player who has transferred the state 
of the game to his own target, despite the efforts of his opponent. 
Both players can win if the intersection of 6)e and (ge is not empty. 
In Case (b), Oe ~ ~, OE = ~ (or (ge ~ ~,  Oe = ~) the prescription for player 
Je (or .)rE) is to transfer the state to Oe (or Oe), and the prescription for his opponent, 
JE (or Je) is to avoid this event. 
If Je (or ./rE) transfers the state of the game to his target despite the efforts of his 
opponent, he is winner. The player who wishes to prevent he state reaching the target 
cannot win since he has no target of his own. 
3.9. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES, SETS OF THE GAME, SURFACE OF THE GAME 
We shall say that p., ~ 5ae is an optimal strategy for player Je at point x i if 
(p , , ,  e) ~ ~=-p(x':) 'v'e ~ 5~' E (5) 
and we shall say that e~, ~ 5fE is an optimal strategy for player JE at point x i if 
(P, %0 E J'e(x 0 Vp ~ Sfe (6) 
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Sets of the game Sp and SE are defined by 
Sp A= {xi: There exists an optimal strategy for Je at x i} (7) 
SE ZX {x~: There exists an optimal strategy for JE at x i} (8) 
One can prove easily that Se ~ SE -= ;~. 
Let there be a fixed set Xp C Sp. We shall say that p ~ Sap is optimal on Xe if 
Vx i e X e Ve ~ baE , (p, e) 9 3"e(x ~) (9) 
Likewise, let there be a fixed set Xe _C SE. We shall say that e E 5T e is optimal on 
XE if 
Vx i e X e Vp e Sap, (p, e) ~ ~E(X i) (10) 
Clearly, a strategy for player Jp (or JE) that is optimal on Xp (or XE) is optimal at all 
points x i ~ Xv (or x ~ 6 Are). 
Surface of the game 3 is the set 
E & G n OSv n 8SE (11) 
where aSv &= Sp n comp Sv,  OSE ~ SE n comp SE, and comp S, S = Se or S = SE, 
means the complement of S in G. Of course, N may be empty. 
3.10. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Now we are ready for stating the problem of qualitative games. We shall consider 
separately two target and one target games; that is Case (a) and Case (b). Let us first 
list the different situations that players Je and Je can meet, in these two cases. 
In Case (a) @p 5~ ~ and @E :~ 
a.1 If x i ~ 3p, then Jp is ensured to win, if he plays optimality, no matter what 
the stategy of J~r. 
a.2 If  x i ~ 3E, then JE is ensured to win, if he plays optimality, no matter what 
the strategy of Jp. 
a.3 If x i r Sp t3 SE, then there is no optimal strategy defined at that point for Jp 
and for JE" 
In Case (b) with @v 5 t: ~ and @e = ;3 
b.1 If  x * ~ Se ,  then Je is ensured to win, if he plays optimality, no matter what 
the strategy of Je .  
b.2 If x * ~ St ,  then JE can prevent Jv from winning, if he plays optimality. 
b.3 If x i r Sp u SE, then there is no optimal strategy defined at that point for 
Jp and for JE. 
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Hence, at the begining of a play the following questions arise: 
I. Doesx i ~ SP U SEor does x i 6 SP • SE ? 
2. If x i ~ Se u SE , does x i ~ Sp or does x i ~ SE ? that is, is there potentially a 
winner, and who is he ? 
3. If x i ~ Sl, ; that is, if Jp is potentially the winner, what strategy is an optimal one 
for him ? and if x i ~ SE, what strategy is an optimal one for JE ? that is, Je in one case, 
JE in the other case, must be able to determine an optimal strategy for himself. 
In general these questions are difficult to answer. In the next section, we shall focus 
our attention on properties of ~. 
4. A MIN-MAx PRINCIPLE 
4.1. A BAsic PROPERTY 
Unless otherwise indicated we shall denote by x ~ points of 3 which do not belong to 
Oe u OE, and which possess the following: 
PROPERTY l. For each point x ~ there exists a neighborhood A(x ~ of x ~ in G, and 
strategies p*o and %%, such that Px* is optimal on A(x ~ (3 Se and e*o is optimal on 
~(x o) (3 s~. 
Furthermore, there exists a neighborhood ofx ~ on which P *xo and e*o are of class C 1. 
4.2. A LINEAR EQUATION AND ITS ADJOINT 
Since for a given point x ~ there exists a neighborhood of x ~ on which p*o and %*~ are 
of class C 1, then there exists a nonnull path ,rv,, emanating from x ~ generated by 
strategy pair (p*o, e*o). Let it be represented by 2: r -+ 2(~-), ~- e [0, %]. } is a solution of 
= f (x ,  p*o(x), e:~(x)) (12) 
that satisfies the initial condition s = x ~ 
One can prove the following: 
LEMMA 1. If, at every point of r%~ , with the possible exception of its end point, there 
exists a neighborhood on which p*o and e*~o are of class C 1, then r%e C Z. 
We shall associate with Eq. (12) a linear equation; namely 
= ~ + ~u ~- -  + ~ ::~<,) ,7 (13) 
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where 
Of A [8 f . (x ,u ,v ) ]  v- - - - l ,2  .... n 
- -  [ J 
8x ---- bx~ ~ ----- 1, 2 .... n 
r h,u,v l . . . .  n 
8u = bu~ ~ -~ 1, 2 .... r t ] 
8v = 8v~ ~ ~ 1, 2 .... s [ 1 
8t, A [8p.(x)]  v = 1,2 .... r 
bx = [ 8x= ] ~ ~ 1,2 .... n 
be /x [ 6e~(x) ] v = 1, 2 .... s 
bx = t 8x~ 1 ~ ~- 1,2 .... n 
By definition, the adjoint equation of (13) is 
where 
In Eq. (13) :p  = p*o , e ----- e*o 
dA (~f by bp*o + ___  A (14) 
(i) ~ A2 
I f  constraints Ku(x ) and Kv(x) are independent of x, adjoint equation (14) reduces to 
dA - -  [o f ] rA  (15) 
dr \~x! 
4.3. ASSUMPTIONS 
Now let us introduce the following: 
ASSUMPTION 1. For all x E 7r~., and for all u E Ku(x) and v ~ Kv(x), there exist 
strategies ~ ~ Sap and fl~ E 5r which are of class C 1 on some neighborhood of x, and which 
satisfy the conditions ~x(x) = u and fix(x) = v, respectively. 
ASSUMPTION 2. At  every point x of rr~, there exists a neighborhood A(x) on which 
p** and e*o are of class C 1. 
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ASSUMPTION. 3. ~ can be represented analytically by the equation 
g(x) = 0 
and, at each point x' = ~(T'), x' (~ 02, u 0~ , of a path ,r~, starting at x ~ there exists 
a neighborhood A(x') of x' on which the function g is of class C x and grad g(x) is defined 
and is different from zero. Let us suppose that, at every point x of A(x') th S~, 
g(x) <~ 0 (16) 
and that, at every point x of A(x') t~ SF. 
g(x) >~ 0 (17) 
Let A(x ~ be a neighborhood of x ~ in G such that p*o and e*o are optimal on 
A(x ~ n St, and A(x ~ t~ SE, respectively; and such that, at every point of A(x ~ n S'e 
and at every point of A(x ~ n SE 
ASSUMPTION 4. A(x ~ t~ ~p and 
constitute a partition of A(x~ 
g(x) <<.o (18) 
g(x) >~ 0 (19) 
A(x o) n S~ (or A(x ~ n ~qe and d(x ~ n ~E) 
ASSUMPTION 5. Let us assume that OOe A= Oe (~ compOeand ~OE A= @E n compOE 
can be represented analytically by the equations 
(~v(x) = 0 and hE(x) ---- 0 (20) 
respectively. 
Furthermore, let us assume that there exist neighborhoods of 02, and OE on which the 
functions he and (~E, respectively, are of class C 1, and grad Oe(x) and grad he(x), 
respectively, are defined and are different from zero. 
4.4. A MIN-MAX PRINCIPLE 
Let 
at(A, x, u, v) A ~ .f(x, u, v) 
One can prove the following: 
THEOREM 14. Let ,r~, be a path emanating from a point x ~ generated by * (p#,  e*o) 
represented by ~: r --+ x = ~(z), ~" e [0, %], % ~ 0. I f  Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are 
See Ref. 4. 
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satisfied, then there exists a nonzero continuous olution ~: ~- --> A : ,~(~-), r e [0, %] of 
adjoint equation (14) such that 
(a) min ueK,,(x) ~'r x, u, e#(x)) = max ~F(A, x, p*o(x), v) v~Kv(x) 
= ,.~(A, x, p*o(X), e*ox(x)) 
,k~(A, x, p:o(x), e:o(x)) = 0 
(b) 
for all 7 e [0, %] and x = ~(-r). 
Furthermore, if Op n OE = r if ~r~, reaches 6)i, (or @E) at point x 1, if Assumptions 4 
and 5 are satisfied, and if Op (or OE) is represented by (~(x) <~ 0 (or (~E(x) >~ 0), then 
(c) ~(%) = K grad ~(x/), 6~ = ~e or ~) = ~)~, K > O. 
4.5. SEMIPERMEABLE SURFACES 
Let us complement Theorem 1 by the following: 
THEOREM 2. I f  there exists a function g: x ~ g(x), x ~ G, such that grad g(x) is 
defined and is different from zero for all x ~ G, and strategies fi and ~ such that 
(a) rain n(x) . f (x,  u, ~(x)) = max n(x) . f (x ,  fi(x), v) u~K.(x) ~K,(x) (21) 
= n(x) . f (x,  fi(x), ~(x)) 
and 
(b) n(x) "f(x, i6(x), ~(x)) = 0 (22) 
for all x ~ G, where n(x) Lx grad g(x); and if there exists a constant C such that 
g(x) < C Vx ~ OF (or g(x) > C Vx ~ OE) 
and if the surface ~(C); namely 
if(C) z~ {x: g(x) = C} (23) 
is not empty; then 
~g(C) C comp Sp (or cg(C) C comp SE). 
Furthermore if OE : ;g and, of course, 6)p :~ 0 ,  then c6(C) C Sz . 
The proof of this Theorem is given in Reference 4. 
A surface W(C) defined by (23) is called a semipermeable surface if grad g(x) is defined 
and is different from zero for all x ~ G, and if there exist strategies fi and ~ such that 
conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem 2 are satisfied. 
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5.1. EXAMPLE 1 
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5. EXAMPLES 
Let us consider a single target qualitative game described by 
with constraints given by 
~ - -  - -2  
=1 
(24) 
where in view of (26) 
The adjoint equations are 
dh~ 
-~z =0,  ~=1,2 ,3  
so that 
~(~) = constant, a = 1, 2, 3 
From Condition (c) of Theorem 1 we have 
,~(~-~) = c~1(~,) 
'~(~1) - O, c > 0 
d = ~x2(~I) + A22(V) (31) 
R 2 
Of course, Assumption 1 is satisfied since the constraints are given by (25), and Assumption 5 
is also satisfied since target {9~ is given by (26). 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
l u l~ l ,  I v [~ l  (25) 
Let 
Op ~_~ {X = (Xl, X2, X3): Op(X) Z~ Xl 2 + X22 - -  R 2 ~ 0} (26) 
Let us suppose that there exists a nonnull path %, ,  emanating from x ~ ~ 9, generated 
by strategy pair (p*o, e*o) represented by ~: r ~ x = ~(r), r ~ [0, rl], that reaches Ov 
at point 07(rl), and that Assumptions 2-4 are satisfied. 5 
The ~ function is 
.~ff(a, x, u, v) = al(u + v) - -  213 + A 3 (27) 
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By (29) and (30) we have 
~(~) - c~(~,) 
L(~) ~ 0 
From Condition (a) of Theorem 1 we obtain 
~(r) & p*o(~(z)) = -- sgn :~(rl) 
~(r) &= e*o(~(r)) = sgn 2a(rt) 
and 
which implies that 
Along ~-~, (24) may be rewritten 
(32) 
(33) 
~2(r) == 0 (34) 
~&,)  = 0 
dXl  - -  0 
d~- 
dx2 - -  2 
dr 
(35) 
Upon integration of (35) we find that a nonnull path rr~e that reaches ~gp at point 
x(~'r) is a straight path whose projection on the x 1 -- x~ plane is given by 
~1(~) - ~1(~,) = +R 
(36) 
The projection on the x I - -  X 2 plane of the two families of paths ~r~, thus obtained 
are sketched on Figure 1. On can prove that the closed shaded area of Figure 1 is 
the projection of a set of E ~ that contains Se,  whereas the open unshaded area is 
the projection of a set of E a contained in SE.  Indeed, Se and SE depend on ~io and ~E. 
5.2. EXAMPLE 2 
Next let us consider another single target qualitative game described by 
dxl 
d~" --  Ul + V 
dx~ 
d~ - -  u2 
dx8 -- 1 
d-r 
(37) 
57 I12/3 -6 
x 2 
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-x 1 
Fio. 1 
with constraints given by 
u~ + u~ <~ w ~, I vl <~ 1 (38) 
Target Op is defined by 
Op ~ {X = (Xl, X2, X3): Op(X ) Z~ .%12 + .X.22 __ R ~ ~< 0} (39) 
Again let us suppose that there exists a nonnull path ~r.~ emanating from x ~ ~ 3, 
generated by (p*o, e*0), where p*o * * = ~(r), = (Pl~o,P2~o), represented by ~: z ~ x 
~" ~ [0, rl], that reaches Op at point s and that Assumptions 2-4 are satisfied. 
Clearly, Assumptions 1 and 5 are also satisfied. 
The ~ function is 
~(~,  X, U, V) = All,/1 -~- A2U 2 + AlV + ~3 (40) 
The adjoint equations are 
d• 
d~ = 0, ~ ---- 1,2, 3 (41) 
so that 
~(r )  = constant, a = 1, 2, 3 (42) 
From Condition (c) of Theorem 1 we have 
, ] t ( ,A  = 
= ,:.,z.,,(.,-,) 
= o ,  c>0 
(43) 
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where, in view of (39) 
By (42) and (43) we have 
R 2 
~1(,) = c~-,(',h 
L,(,,-) = c~,,(-,-1) 
~(-,-) -= 0 
From Condition (a) of Theorem 1 we obtain 
Ul(T) = --~0 ~I(T) 
[~1'(~) + ~,'(~)]'~ 
~(~) 
a,(~) = -w [~1~(~ ) + 7,Z(~)]. '
R 
~(~-~) 
R 
~(~') = sgn ~l(r) = sgn ~1(rl) 
where 
and 
/s = P~xo(X('r)), U$(q') = P*~o(~(~)), ~(~') = e*o(~(*')) 
-w[L~(,-)  + ~Z(-,-)] 1'~ + I ,~.(-..-)t = o 
From (42), (43) and (47) we deduce 
I ~1(',.~)1 I &bAI  
[~?(~t) + ~(~i)] '~ R 
Hence the following condition 
i ~1ffl)1 = Rw 
must be satisfied at a point where a nonnull path ~r~ reaches @e, 
Along r%e (37) may be rewritten 
arxl . ~(~- j )  
dT -- --w ~ -k sgn .~1("rl) 
dx~ ~(-rt) 
dr R 
dx3 --  1 
d-r 
301 
(44)  
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
302 BLAQUI~RE AND GERARD 
Upon integration of (50) we find that a nonnull path ~r~ that reaches Oe at point 
~(rl) is a straight path whose projection on the x 1 - -  x 2 plane is given by 
x~ = ax l + b (51) 
where 
~,(~) w 
a z~ x1(~I) _ R Iw sgn  2~(~'I)  = =j= [1 - -  w~] 1/~ 
R R 
b :-- - -  --w a sgn s = :t: [I - -  w~] :/~ 
A straight line given by Eq. (51) in the x I - -  x~ plane intersects the xl-axis at point P: 
x 1 = R/w,  or at point Q: x 1 ~- - -R /w depending on the sign of ~l(rs). It is tangent o 
the circumference xl~ + x~ 2 -= RL 
Hence, the above arguments yield 4 families of paths whose projections on the 
x t - -  x 2 plane belong to the 4 half-rays P 'M ' ,  P"M" ,  Q 'N ' ,  Q"N"  sketched on Figure 2. 
) 
/ :`:::::~LL::::~:+~+:<~::~::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::~:LL~::2~:~:L~ 
-R/w Q /\ ~:::I:i:~:~:i:i~:i:~:i:i:!:~:!:~!~:i:i:i:::i:i:i:i:i~:~:~:i:i:i:~:i:~::1:i:~:1:i::~:!:~!:~:~:~:~:~: Ii:!:!:::!:+::::::::::::::::i:::i~:~::~:;~:ii~il - ~- x 1 
",Mii \ 
d' :~i!ii!iiii!iiiii!iiii!iiiiii[ilili}ifiiiiiiii!i[iiiiiiiiiii[iiiiiiii~: P" Q" P" X 
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Now, let us consider the case where a < 0 and b > 0 namely 
In that case, we have 
and hence 
W a - -  
[1 - -  w2] ~12 
R 
b= 
[1 - w2] 112 
~2(re) = R[1 - -  7.02] 1 /2  
~1(7)  ~ cRw 
~2(T) ~-  cR[ i  - -  702] 1/2 
~.(~)  - o 
Consider a plane c~i(C ) given by 
g(x) ~ x 2 - ax a - b = C 
We have 
with C > 0 
g(x)  < C Vx ~ 01. 
and 
1 
n(x) &= grad g(x) = ( - -a ,  1, O) - -  Rc[1 - -  w2] 1/2 ,~(r) 
Of course, Conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem 6.2 are satisfied with 
S;(~) = ~(",) = [ -wL  -~(1  - w<,)x,,q 
and hence, according to Theorem 2, Cgl(C ) is a semipermeable surface such that 
c~I(C ) C comp Se, for all C > 0 
By similar arguments one can see that planes c~2(C), W3(C) and ~4(C) given by 
x2- -axa- -b=C a>0,  b<0,  C<0 
x~- -ax i - -b=C a<O,  b<O,  C<O 
x~ - -  axl  - -  b = C a > O, b>0,  C>0 
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respectively, are semipermeable surfaces uch that 
c~z(c) C comp Sel for all c :> 0 
c~a(c ) C comp Sp 
rfs(c ) C comp Sp for all c > 0 
One can prove that the shaded closed area of Figure 2 is the projection on the 
x 1 - -  x 2 plane of a set of E 3 that contains St, whereas the open unshaded area is 
the projection of a set of E a contained in SE. Indeed, Sp and SE depend on 5~'p 
and S" E . 
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